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Abstract
Environmental quality in many developing countries is poor and generates substan-
tial health and productivity costs. However, existing measures of willingness to pay
for environmental quality improvements indicate low valuations by aﬀected households.
This paper argues that this seeming paradox is the central puzzle at the intersection of
environmental and development economics: Given poor environmental quality and high
health burdens in developing countries, why is WTP so low? We develop a conceptual
framework for understanding this puzzle and propose four potential explanations: (1)
due to low income levels, individuals value increases in income more than marginal im-
provements in environmental quality, (2) the marginal costs of environmental quality
improvements are high, (3) political economy factors undermine eﬃcient policy-making,
and (4) market failures such as weak property rights and missing capital markets drive
a wedge between true and revealed willingness to pay for environmental quality. We
review the available literature on each explanation and discuss how the framework also
applies to climate change, which is perhaps the most important issue at the intersection
of environment and development economics. The paper concludes with a list of promis-
ing and unanswered research questions for the emerging sub-field of “envirodevonomics.”
∗Greenstone: Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER. Jack: Tufts University and NBER. We
are grateful to Eric Lewis and Jonathan Petkun for excellent research assistance and to the Editor and four
anonymous referees for comments and suggestions.
1
1 Introduction
Most visitors to developing country cities notice the poor environmental quality: their eyes
sting, the water makes them sick, the views are obscured by smog. These casual observations
are backed up by the data. Figure 1 shows air and water quality in developed and developing
countries. The top panel shows airborne particulate matter concentrations in urban centers,
while the bottom panel shows dissolved oxygen, a measure of good water quality.1 The
developing countries are remarkably dirtier (higher particulates, lower dissolved oxygen).2
These stark diﬀerences in environmental quality appear to have paradoxical consequences.
On the one hand, the available evidence suggests that they lead to large health and produc-
tivity losses. For example, Figure 2 shows the striking diﬀerences in the burden of disease
from air and water pollution in developed and developing countries, as calculated by the
World Health Organization.3 On the other hand in spite of this large disease burden, the
studies measuring willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental quality improvements in-
dicate low valuations by aﬀected households. For example, the value of a statistical life
imputed from households’ WTP for access to clean water in Kenya is USD2013 860, while
typical VSL numbers from the United States are on the order of USD2013 8.6 million (US
EPA 2010).4
These seemingly contradictory facts raise a series of compelling questions and puzzles.
Given poor environmental quality and high health burdens in developing countries, why
is WTP so low? Put another way, is the value of a life in Kenya, as suggested by the
revealed preference data (Kremer et al. 2011), really 10,000 times lower than typical figures
for the value of a statistical life in the United States? Is the current level of environmental
quality in developing countries optimal, leaving no room for policy improvements (i.e., is
poor environmental quality just another dimension of poverty)? Is it possible that the welfare
1Particulate matter comes both from primary sources (incomplete combustion, dust) and secondary re-
actions in the atmosphere. Particles smaller than 10 micrometers in diameter are typically associated with
the greatest risk to human health. Dissolved oxygen is a proxy for organic waste, which requires oxygen for
decomposition, in the water. Sources of organic waste include sewage and urban runoﬀ (US EPA).
2We follow the UN categorization of developed and developing countries (UN Statistics Division), though
the binary country-level classification overlooks large variations both within category and within country.
3Obtaining causal estimates of the health consequences of environmental quality is challenging. Random-
ized control trials are unethical in most settings, and quasi-experiments face limitations when it comes to
long-run impacts. In this paper, beginning in section 3, we emphasize the findings from experimental and
quasi-experimental studies that we believe provide the most reliable causal estimates of the health impacts
of pollution in developing countries.
4As the conceptual framework makes explicit, WTP includes not only the valuation of morbidity and
mortality benefits of improved environmental quality (VSL), but also aesthetic and income benefits.
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loss from poor environmental quality in developed countries is greater than in developing
countries in spite of the substantially cleaner conditions in the former?
This paper argues that a series of urgent economic and policy questions about environ-
mental quality in developing countries cannot be properly analyzed or understood with the
tools of environmental economics alone or the tools of development economics alone. We
believe that credible answers to these questions require the development of a new sub-field
that is at the intersection of these two larger and more well established fields. At the risk
of excessive reductionism, we argue that this sub-field can be organized around a central
question: why is environmental quality so poor in developing countries?
This paper develops four potential explanations for the poor state of environmental qual-
ity in developing countries that apply in varying degrees across contexts. First and most
obviously, environmental quality may be low because of low WTP for improvements. There
are several possible causes of low WTP, including – most centrally – high marginal utility
of consumption at low income levels. Second, high marginal costs of environmental quality
improvements would also result in a lack of regulation to address pollution or deforestation.
Marginal costs are likely to be higher where policy design, implementation and enforcement is
weak. Third, the political economy of policy making in developing countries may distort the
policy process. Poor environmental quality could then be explained by policy makers who do
not implement the preferences of their constituents or implement the preferences of a subset
of constituents at the expense of the majority. Fourth, WTP for environmental quality may
be distorted by market failures, including both the classic market failures of public goods
and externalities, and also the market imperfections more common to developed countries:
missing land, capital and labor markets.5
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. The next section presents a simple
conceptual framework for understanding why environmental quality is so poor in developing
countries. Section 3 selectively reviews the existing empirical evidence on the health and
productivity consequences of poor environmental quality, and on the potential underlying
causes of low WTP, marginal costs, political economy and market failures. Many papers have
been written on these topics, but we focus attention on the relatively small set of papers that
employ evaluation techniques that are likely to produce credible estimates of the underlying
causal relationship or that open new areas of inquiry. One important theme in this section
5Environmental quality is aﬀected by the decisions of both individuals and policy makers. The first,
second and fourth of these explanations aﬀect individual preferences and choices directly, as well as in the
aggregate. The third explanation directly aﬀects the actions of policy makers, which may in turn change
individual decisions in response to a distorted policy environment.
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is that a confluence of events – the recognition of the substantial threats to well-being posed
by poor environmental quality, improved modeling of behavior, the increasing availability of
data in developing countries, and the recognition of surprisingly frequent opportunities for
quasi-experimental and experimental determination of key parameters – provide ample fuel
for the development of a rich and nuanced field where a combination of theory and empirics
can produce economic insights with the potential to greatly increase social welfare. Finally,
Section 4 focuses on climate change as a central pressing and policy relevant issue at the
forefront of environmental and development economics. It is in many ways the ultimate
research topic as it poses an existential threat to human well-being and encompasses all of
the explanations for poor environmental quality in developing countries. Section 5 concludes
by highlighting key areas for further theoretical and empirical research.
2 Why is environmental quality so poor in developing
countries?
This section lays out a conceptual framework for understanding the causes of poor envi-
ronmental quality in developing countries. We consider a representative agent with utility
from consumption, environmental quality and health. The social planner aggregates agent
preferences and maximizes net benefits by setting marginal benefits equal to marginal costs.6
We explore four explanations for poor environmental quality: (1) the marginal utility of con-
sumption is higher than the marginal utility of environmental quality improvements, (2) the
marginal costs of environmental quality improvements are high, (3) political economy dis-
torts the social planner’s optimization problem, and (4) market failures cause agents’ WTP
for environmental quality to diverge from their valuations in the first best. Note that the
first two of these explanations require no deviation from the first best, while the second two
assume some additional constraints on optimization. These explanations are not mutually
exclusive but any one is suﬃcient to explain the observed poor environmental quality in
developing countries.
6Our approach in the conceptual framework therefore abstracts from important diﬀerences in the feasi-
bility and costs of improving environmental quality through individual actions versus interventions at the
state or federal level. We return to this issue when we discuss the marginal costs and political economy of
environmental quality improvements.
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2.1 Conceptual framework
We consider the WTP for environmental quality of a representative agent endowed with
initial income y0, initial health quality h0, and initial environmental quality e0. The agent
chooses consumption c, improvements in environmental quality ∆e, and a level of self pro-
tection s to maximize utility:
U(e, h(s, e), c) (1)
subject to the budget constraint
y ≥ ce(∆e) + cs(s) + c (2)
where income and environmental quality are defined by
y = y0 +∆y(e, h(s, e)) (3)
e = e0 +∆e+ a(c, s) (4)
and the function a(c, s) captures the impact of consumption and self protection on environ-
mental quality as experienced by the agent.
This utility function highlights a number of channels that aﬀect preferences for environ-
mental quality. First, environmental quality aﬀects utility directly through, for example,
aesthetic preferences or existence values. Second, environmental quality aﬀects utility in-
directly via health (which in turn aﬀects income), h(s, e). For example, workers exposed
to high levels of pollution may be less productive. The eﬀect of environmental quality on
health can be mitigated through spending on self protection, s, such as indoor air purifiers or
water treatment. Finally, environmental quality aﬀects income (equation 3), which in turn
aﬀects utility via the budget constraint. Tourism revenue from a national park or agricul-
tural income that is sensitive to water quality or the presence of pollinators are examples of
environment-dependent income.
In addition, by allowing consumption to aﬀect environmental quality (equation 4), the
model acknowledges that agents may aﬀect environmental quality both directly, through ∆e,
and indirectly, through c. We model this as a(c, s) to highlight consumption geared toward
self protection, such as air conditioning or bottled water, that create feedbacks between
self protection, health and environmental quality. Most of the eﬀects of consumption on
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environmental quality are externalities, such that the privately felt impact a(c, s) is less
than the social impact aS(c, s). To the extent that a(c, s) ￿= aS(c, s), private optimization
will not deliver the first best, and agents will, in most cases, over-consume.
In the first best, where a(c, s) = aS(c, s), the agent chooses ∆e, s and c to equalize the
marginal utility of these investments. Willingness to pay is therefore the marginal benefit of
environmental quality or the marginal rate of substitution between income and environmental
quality.
MB = WTPe =
∂U
∂e
+
∂U
∂h
∂h
∂e
∂U
∂c
+
∂U
∂e
∂a
∂c
+
∂∆y
∂e
+
∂∆y
∂h
∂h
∂e
(5)
The marginal benefit function expresses in dollars how much the agent will be willing
to pay for a marginal increase in environmental quality. Willingness to pay is composed of
the aesthetic benefit from improved environmental quality (scaled by the marginal utility
of consumption), the indirect benefit of environmental quality for health (again scaled by
the MU of consumption), as well as the impact of environment on income and the indirect
impact of environmental quality on income via the changes in health.7
Similarly we can also calculate WTP for self protection s:
WTPs =
∂U
∂e
∂a
∂s
+
∂U
∂h
∂h
∂s
∂U
∂c
+
∂U
∂e
∂a
∂c
+
∂∆y
∂h
∂h
∂s
(6)
The WTP for self-protection is composed of the indirect eﬀect of self protection on environ-
mental quality (
∂U
∂e
∂a
∂s
), as well as the indirect eﬀect of self protection on health (
∂U
∂h
∂h
∂s
).
If the marginal utility of consumption is concave, then WTPs is higher at higher levels of
consumption, as long as any negative impacts of self-protection on environmental quality
can be oﬀset by compensatory investment in self-protection (in other words, the second of
these indirect eﬀects can be used to oﬀset the first). Thus, agents will prefer a higher income
with greater investment in self-protection even if self-protection has a negative impact on
7A large literature investigates the hypothesis that there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between
income and environmental quality—the so-called environmental Kuznets curve (e.g., Grossman and Krueger
(1995); Andreoni and Levinson (2001); for reviews of the literature, see Dasgupta et al. (2002); Stern (2004)).
A number of potential explanations underlie the proposed relationship, including ones consistent with the
micro model we present here. The macro relationship does not, however, appear robust across pollutants or
time (Harbaugh et al. 2002).
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environmental quality.
In this first best environment, the social planner aggregates utility to arrive at a social
welfare function. In the framework above, the marginal cost of improving environmental
quality is c￿e(∆e) and the marginal cost of self protection is c￿s(s). The social planner will
therefore set the marginal costs of environmental quality improvements and of self protection
equal to their respective marginal benefits, such that the ratios are equal to each other:
MBe
MBs
=
c￿e(∆e)
c￿s(s)
(7)
It is straightforward to incorporate the two deviations from the first best that we consider
– political economy and market failures – as additional elements in the social planner’s
problem. We now turn to four explanations for poor environmental quality in developing
countries, including discussions of these two possible deviations from the first best.
2.2 Explanation 1: High marginal utility of consumption
We begin with the straightforward explanation that WTP is low because people are poor and
therefore the marginal utility of consumption is high relative to the marginal utility of envi-
ronmental quality. This explanation requires no deviation from the first best assumptions,
and measured WTP accurately reflects preferences under a very tight budget constraint.
This is straightforward to see in the comparative statics of our framework. The agent trades
oﬀ consumption and environmental quality by setting the marginal utility of environmental
quality equal to the marginal utility of consumption. If the marginal utility of consumption
is concave, then the agent is most likely to forgo investments in environmental quality in
favor of consumption at low levels of consumption. For example, even if improvements in
environment quality lead to large, measurable health gains that improve the quality of life,
these improvements may still be small relative to the utility gains (also possibly through
improved health) that an agent experiences from an increase in consumption.
Consider an extension of the simple model above to one with two periods. If the proba-
bility of living to the next period in time is aﬀected by environmental quality or health, then
WTP for environmental quality will increase with income. Because later period consump-
tion is increasing in income, and the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, WTP
for environmental quality will increase as income increases. Hall and Jones (2007) show
that this holds for health spending, and the intuition extends to any good that increases
the probability of living to the next period, provided that utility is additively separable over
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time.
2.3 Explanation 2: High marginal costs
Without departing from assumptions of the first best, high marginal costs of providing en-
vironmental quality can explain the observed poor quality in developing countries. Even in
contexts with high WTP and a benevolent social planner, high marginal costs are suﬃcient
to make improvements to environmental quality ineﬃcient, as shown by equation 7. Intu-
ition suggests that increasing marginal costs of abatement would imply lower marginal costs
of environmental quality improvements in settings with few existing regulations and high
levels of pollution. However, marginal costs of environmental quality improvement are not
necessarily driven by abatement costs alone; they also reflect capacity for policy design and
implementation. In settings where either or both are weak, the marginal cost of environmen-
tal quality improvement may be high even if marginal abatement costs are relatively low.
Alternatively, low marginal cost of self-protection may lead individuals or policy makers to
prefer investments in self-protection to improvements in environmental quality.
Other investments in the economy can aﬀect the marginal cost of environmental quality
improvements. For example, regulatory costs are likely to be decreasing in the infrastructure
associated with monitoring the production process. Relative to developed countries, many
of these complementary investments in infrastructure are absent or nascent, resulting in
higher marginal costs of environmental quality improvements. Changes in regulation or the
centralized provision of environmental quality also aﬀect the privately optimal investment
choice of individuals or firms, which may enhance or undermine resulting improvements in
environmental quality. Peltzman-style compensatory behavior may be especially likely in
settings where the public provision of environmental quality exceeds the socially optimal
level (Peltzman 1975).
2.4 Explanation 3: Political economy and rent seeking behavior
In a first best world, where the social planner implements aggregate preferences, poor envi-
ronmental quality implies low WTP or high marginal costs of environmental quality improve-
ments. However, in a world of political economy constraints, poor environmental quality may
stem from a social planner who does not optimize according to the first best, as laid out
in equation 7. Political economy factors add an additional element to the social welfare
function, such as the social planner’s own payoﬀ or utility weights on her preferred group
8
(see Fisman (2001) for a compelling example of utility weights). In many cases, this will
result in a downward bias on the optimal level of environmental quality, by driving a wedge
between aggregate preferences and the benefits over which the social planner optimizes.
2.5 Explanation 4: Measured WTP may not measure true WTP
While the relationship between income and WTP for environmental quality can explain a
valuation gap between rich and poor countries, revealed preference measures of WTPmay not
equal WTP in the first best, due to market failures or behavioral heuristics and biases. In our
conceptual framework, market failures, both from public goods and externalities and from
the institutional failures present in many developing countries, result in marginal benefits
from environmental quality improvements (MB￿) that do not equal the first best marginal
benefit (MB∗). A social planner who observes only revealed preferences may choose a level
of environmental quality that is suboptimal because it is based on MB￿ rather than MB∗.
If the cost of moving from MB￿ to MB∗ is less than the improvement in social welfare, then
correcting the market failure can lead to a Pareto improvement.
2.5.1 Public goods and externalities
Environmental economics is a field built on studying the market failures associated with
public goods and externalities (Baumol and Oates 1988). In these situations, each agent’s
choice of ∆e aﬀects the utility of other agents, and because of these externalities, agents do
not make socially eﬃcient investments in∆e. We can see this in the context of our conceptual
framework by allowing the private and social costs of consumption to diverge: a(c, s) >
aS(c, s). The first term in the expression for WTP for environmental quality (equation 5)
is decreasing in the second term in the denominator, which we can assume to be negative
in the case of negative externalities from consumption. If agents undervalue these negative
externalities, then they will also reveal a WTP for environmental quality that is below the
first best. More simply, if an investment in ∆e generates positive externalities, these will
not enter into the agent’s optimization problem, further lowering WTP for environmental
quality.
A social planner who aggregates across agents will, of course, internalize many of these
externalities, to the extent that they fall within her jurisdiction. Generally, the public
goods nature of environmental quality does not diﬀer substantially between developed and
developing countries but, as we detail below, externalities may be exacerbated by and interact
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with other market failures that are more prevalent in developing country settings.
2.5.2 Market failures from development economics
The classic market failures of developing economies may have important implications for
observed WTP for environmental quality and, as a result, the choice of environmental policy.
If all markets function well, the transformation of y into environmental quality and self
protection and the transfer of y across periods is frictionless. However when information,
credit, risk, or land markets are imperfect, then the WTP for environmental quality that
maximizes utility can be distorted away from the first best due to these imperfections.
Furthermore, these diﬀerent types of market failures may interact in complicated ways that
can make an otherwise eﬃcient correction (e.g., a Pigouvian tax) to one market failure
suboptimal in the presence of others (e.g., weak property rights). These market failures can
be modeled in a number of ways (for an overview see Bardhan and Udry (1999)), and rather
than adopt a single modeling approach, we oﬀer an intuitive discussion of the relationship
between market failures and WTP for environmental quality. For these market failures,
whether revealed WTP (MB￿) is above or below MB∗ is theoretically ambiguous.
Revealed preference measures of WTP rely on individuals knowing the payoﬀs from in-
vestments in environmental quality. Residents of developing countries face a number of
barriers associated with the quantity and quality of available information. Mis-information
may be more persistent in developing countries because of a lack of liability rules around
the provision of health information, or because markets fail to convey incentives for accurate
information to producers. Developing country governments may also fail to provide accurate
information about environmental quality and health. In addition, individuals may be illit-
erate or lack the education needed to understand the available information. Furthermore in
information-poor settings, individuals may neglect to include the eﬀect of health on income
(equation 3) when optimizing utility, resulting in revealed preference MB￿ measures below
their full-information preferences (MB∗).
Credit market failures, like many developing country market imperfections, stem from
a diﬃculty in writing and enforcing contracts. High costs associated with monitoring bor-
rowers and enforcing repayment where borrowers are liquidity constrained can lead to high
interest rates or credit rationing (Conning and Udry 2007). Thus in settings with credit
market frictions, agents may not be able to pay upfront for investments that generate future
improvements in environmental quality, and therefore in income or health. The result is that
estimates of WTP for environmental quality may be confounded with liquidity constraints.
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Similarly, missing risk markets can lower individual willingness to invest in environmental
quality improvements if the payoﬀs are uncertain and insurance is not available. Worsening
environmental quality may increase the variability of income due to natural disasters or in-
directly via health shocks. Missing insurance markets may increase agents’ WTP to avoid
these added risks. Furthermore, if an agent faces multiple environmental or health risks
(such as both contaminated water and polluted air), the WTP to improve quality of one
environmental factor may be aﬀected by the endowment of the other environmental factor.
In an “O-ring” style model, WTP can be driven to zero in the presence of numerous envi-
ronmental risks (Kremer 1993). Alternatively one environmental good might be a substitute
for another such that WTP for one good decreases with the endowment of the other one.
Consider also the example of imperfect land markets or poorly defined property rights.
Weak land tenure may lower WTP for environmental quality investments, such as tree plant-
ing or erosion mitigation, because agents are uncertain about their ability to retain the
benefits from these investments. Incomplete property rights introduce frictions into the re-
lationship between environmental quality and income, and to the transfer of income across
periods. At the same time, where property rights are ill-defined, private bargaining solutions
to environmental externalities are unlikely to arise, as Coase (1960) pointed out. In these
examples, revealed preference measures of WTP will be below the first best because of weak
property rights.
2.5.3 Behavioral heuristics and cognitive biases
Numerous behavioral and cognitive biases are likely to aﬀect revealed preference measures
of WTP for environmental quality (see Shogren and Taylor 2008 for a review of behavioral
environmental economics). Behavioral biases are most likely to aﬀect decision making in
situations where decisions are infrequent, outcomes are probabilistic and consequences are
in the future. In developing countries, market failures undermine the feedback that helps
individuals learn from their previous decisions and exacerbate standard behavioral biases
(Bertrand et al. 2004). For example, if the eﬀects of health on productivity are distant or
uncertain, they may be systematically underweighted for behavioral reasons. Additionally,
unlike in developed countries where air, water and food are all governed by a set of regulations
that ensure high quality, residents of developing countries must continuously take actions to
minimize exposure to ambient pollution (Mullainathan 2006; Duflo 2012). Research in other
settings has demonstrated the power of defaults to shape behavior (e.g., Caroll et al. 2009)
and the potential for repeated decision making to deplete cognitive energy (e.g., Vohs et al.
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2008). Thus, psychological factors may exacerbate the distortions on revealed preference
WTP measures in the presence of market or government failures.
3 Existing evidence
A long history of theoretical and empirical economic research on environmental issues in
developing countries has generated considerable insight into these issues (see, for a review,
Dasgupta (2009)). However, we believe that a confluence of trends has created the conditions
necessary for a new literature to bloom that has the potential to inform the question of why
environmental quality is so poor in developing countries. This section describes these trends
and the opportunity they create. It then reviews the emerging empirical evidence that at-
tempts to quantify the impacts of poor environmental quality, as well as the existing evidence
on the four potential explanations for the low levels of environmental quality in developing
countries. Throughout, we highlight the areas where the opportunities for new research are
greatest. We conclude this section with a review of the theory and macroeconomics research
that is relevant to the intersection of environmental and development economics and continue
to point out areas where further work would be especially fruitful.
3.1 A promising confluence of trends
We believe that a confluence of at least four diﬀerent trends has created the conditions
necessary for a literature to emerge that answers questions of great social and economic
importance at the intersection of environment and development economics. First and perhaps
most obviously, there is a growing recognition of the extreme levels of pollution in many
developing countries. As one example, measured Chinese air pollution concentrations exceed
those ever recorded in any other country, which may be partially explained by the absence
of reliable monitoring equipment in the first half of the 20th century in the US and Europe,
but still highlights the extraordinary levels of pollution faced by Chinese citizens today.8
Relatedly, the literature on the health eﬀects of pollution have advanced greatly in the last
two decades although almost all of this research has been conducted in developed country
settings, where pollution levels are less extreme (for example, Chay and Greenstone (2003);
Currie and Neidell (2005); Currie and Walker (2011)). At least in terms of human health,
8See relevant articles in a recent Review of Environmental Economics and Policy special issue (e.g.,
Vennemo et al. 2009; Cao et al. 2009)
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the stakes appear high.
Second, advances in modeling individual and firm behavior open the door to the estima-
tion of parameters with a clear economic interpretation. Many of these advancements have
occurred outside of the development or environmental literatures, but lend themselves well
to theoretical application and empirical work on the determinants and eﬀects of environmen-
tal quality in developing countries. In Section 3.4, we summarize some of these theoretical
advancements and highlight areas with substantial opportunities for innovation. The best
empirical work will contribute to the identification of relevant parameters in the social plan-
ner’s maximization problem, and therefore requires a clear theoretical underpinning of how
revealed preference measures are tied to a conceptual parameter.9 As the studies below make
clear, the greatest progress has been made in quantifying the impact of environmental quality
on health (h(e)), rather than the willingness to pay for such a change. In addition, the vast
majority of studies related to willingness to pay have focused on health channels, rather than
direct eﬀects (U ￿(e)) or other indirect channels such as income (∆y￿(e)). Presumably, this is
largely due to the challenges of measuring the relevant outcomes or of credibly identifying
the eﬀects of environmental quality on non-health parameters, though continued theoretical
advancements will facilitate new and better empirical tests. Though our focus in this paper
is on microeconomic topics and research, we also use Section 3.4 to highlight the emerging
macroeconomic work on growth and the environment.
Third, a number of breakthroughs in measurement and access provide researchers with
new developing country datasets. Many countries, including China and India (see Green-
stone and Hanna (2013)), are beginning to open up to economic research on environmental
quality. Technology, such as satellite imagery, allows researchers to bypass local data collec-
tion obstacles, which can be important where government oﬃcials have incentives to distort
environmental data (e.g., Chen et al. (2013) on gaming of air quality data in China). Indeed,
a growing number of papers rely on satellite imagery to measure outcomes including pollu-
tion (Foster et al. 2009; Jayachandran 2009), deforestation (Burgess et al. 2012; Alix-Garcia
et al. 2013) and economic activity (Henderson et al. 2011). Others use geographic infor-
mation system maps to generate instruments for development outcomes (Duflo and Pande
2007; Dinkelman 2011; Lipscomb et al. 2013).
Fourth, there is a greater appreciation of the opportunities for conducting studies based on
quasi-experimental and true experimental variation in key parameters. Just as in developed
countries, many developing countries implement policies in seemingly arbitrary ways or use
9Potentially, but by no means exclusively, the ones laid out in Section 2.
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discrete rules to determine eligibility, which facilitates credible policy evaluation. Examples
include China’s Huai River policy, which provided free coal for winter heating to the north of
the river but forbade winter heating with coal in the south (Chen et al. 2013), and Mexico’s
appliance buy-back program, which set subsidy levels based on past energy consumption
thresholds (Davis et al. 2012). In addition, there has been a near explosion of studies
in developing countries that demonstrate the power of randomized control trials or field
experiments to identify key parameters or relationships (e.g., Berry et al. (2011); Duflo et al.
(2012, 2013); Jack (2013); Kremer et al. (2011); Miller and Mobarak (2011); Bennear et al.
(2012), and others still in progress). Experiments cannot, of course, answer many important
questions in environmental and development economics, yet they serve as a complement
to other empirical methods that may be better suited to understanding problems such as
climate change.
We now turn to reviewing the existing literature.10 Many relevant papers have been
written, but due to space constraints we restrict ourselves to the relatively small set of
papers that employ evaluation techniques especially likely to produce credible estimates
of the underlying causal relationship or that open new areas of inquiry on environmental
problems in developing countries.
3.2 Quantifying the impact of poor environmental quality
Pollution levels in developing countries often exceed the standards set by regulators in de-
veloped countries and by global health recommendations (as shown in Figure 1). Whether
higher pollution levels translates into worse health outcomes depends both on the shape of
the dose-response curve and also behavioral adaptations to the high levels of pollution, such
as staying indoors on heavily polluted days and the purchase of air purifiers. An emerging
body of evidence focuses on the relationship between pollution and health outcomes in de-
veloping countries, and suggests that poor environmental quality substantially compromises
human health in these settings.
Many of the relevant studies focus on the health impacts of air pollution (h￿(e)). For
example, Almond et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2013) use the geographic discontinuity
created by a Chinese policy to subsidize coal north of the Huai River to estimate a significant
increase in total suspended particulate matter (TSP). TSP has a large eﬀect on mortality
10See also review articles from the recent special issue on environmental quality and economic development
in the Review of Environmental Economics and Policy (e.g., Vincent 2010; Pattanayak et al. 2010; Blackman
2010; Somanathan 2010).
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rates: increasing the long-term exposure to TSPs by 100 ￿g/m3 is associated with a decrease
of 2.5 years of life expectancy. This estimate is larger than the eﬀect measured in developed
countries and is five times the conventional OLS estimate. Because of China’s extreme
policies on migration during the period of study, the authors are able to study pollution
eﬀects on life expectancy, which is typically diﬃcult to identify given migration and other
self-selection responses to long run pollution exposure.
Other papers in this literature focus on infant and child health outcomes to mitigate
concerns about unmeasured lifetime exposure. Jayachandran (2009) takes an innovative
approach to measuring the “missing children” associated with extreme pollution exposure
during infancy and utero due to forest fires in Indonesia. She uses satellite aerosol monitoring
data to show that the particulate matter emitted by the fires led to a reduction in the size
of the exposed birth cohort by 1.2 percent, an eﬀect that is largely explained by pre-natal
exposure. A recent study by Arceo, Hanna and Oliva (2012) finds that exposure to carbon
monoxide and particulate matter increases infant mortality in Mexico City. They use the
frequency of thermal inversions, which trap pollutants close to the ground, as a source of
plausibly exogenous variation in pollution exposure. Looking at exposure over the previous
week, they find that a 1 ￿g/m3 increase in particulate matter increases infant deaths per
100,000 by 0.24, while a 1 part per billion increase in carbon monoxide increases infant
deaths per 100,000 by 0.0032 per week. Comparing their results to other studies, they find
that – in elasticity terms – carbon monoxide has a larger eﬀect on infant mortality in Mexico
than in the U.S., while the impact of particulate matter on infant mortality is similar to or
smaller than in the U.S.
A number of papers have also documented serious health impacts from poor water quality
in developing countries. For example, Ebenstein (2012) studies the eﬀects of industrial water
pollution on stomach cancer in China. Like in Chen et al. (2013), historical restrictions on
mobility in China make it possible to estimate long run health outcomes, with diminished
concerns about selection. Specifically, Ebenstein (2012) finds that a decline in water quality
by one grade (on a scale of 1 to 6) is associated with a 9.7 percent increase in deaths from
digestive cancers.
Other studies look at the child health outcomes of poor water quality. Field, Glennerster,
and Hussam (2011) find when households in Bangladesh switched from deep wells to surface
wells contaminated with fecal bacteria, infant and child mortality from diarrhea disease
increased by 27 percent. Brainerd and Menon (2012) use the seasonality associated with
the application of fertilizers across diﬀerent crops and regions of India to identify significant
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eﬀects on numerous infant and child health outcomes including infant mortality, neonatal
mortality, height-for-age z scores and weight-for-age z-scores. In their data, the eﬀects are
strongest in low socioeconomic status households. Kremer et al. (2011) find that a spring
protection investment in Kenya reduced fecal contamination by 66 percent, which led to a
reduction in child diarrhea of 25 percent. Duflo, Greenstone, Guiteras, and Clasen (2013)
find that providing communal water tanks and private bathing and toilets to households
decreases severe episodes of diarrhea by 30-50 percent over the long run.
As illustrated in the conceptual framework, better environmental quality may also have
direct or indirect eﬀects on income. While these relationships may be more diﬃcult to
quantify than the direct health impacts, they are important for the development of a com-
prehensive measure of the benefits of improved environmental quality. To the best of our
knowledge, only two studies credibly show more direct eﬀects of environmental quality on
income (i.e. ∆y￿(e) > 0). First, Aragón and Rud (2013) show that the pollution associated
with gold mining in Ghana has a negative impact on income from agriculture. They esti-
mate an agricultural production function and analyze the eﬀect of mining on the residuals
of productivity, which is shown to correspond to an 18 percent increase in rural poverty.
The empirical strategy relies on geo-referenced data on the location of mines and satellite
imagery to measure air pollution (nitrogen dioxide). Second, some evidence suggests di-
rect income eﬀects from improved environmental quality associated with ecotourism. Sims
(2010) uses placement rules for protected areas in Thailand, together with satellite data and
survey measures of poverty to document both a significant impact of protection status on
deforestation and a positive impact on consumption and poverty reduction. In this case, the
channel appears to be increased local revenue from tourism.
Indirect eﬀects have been documented via productivity and health (i.e. ∆y￿(h(e))). Using
a diﬀerence in diﬀerence strategy, with additional variation in exposure from seasonal wind
patterns, Hanna and Oliva (2011) examine the eﬀect of a decrease in pollution resulting
from the closure of a refinery in Mexico City. They find that a one percent decrease in
sulfur dioxide concentrations increased labor supply by 0.61 hours per week. They present
suggestive evidence that the eﬀects are driven by child health, which aﬀects parental labor
supply. Pitt and Rosenzweig (2012) find evidence that arsenic exposure lowers cognition
and results in lower schooling attainment using biological measures of arsenic (i.e., toenail
clippings) and variation associated with genetic predisposition to store arsenic in the body.
Kremer et al. (2011) also measure the eﬀect of pollution on productivity in their study
of springs in Kenya, and find that improvements to water quality did not increase school
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attendance among primary school children.
Taken as a whole, these papers indicate that the health burden of air and water pollution
in developing countries are substantial and that the productivity and income eﬀects may
also be important. There is still a great deal to learn about does-response functions, the
distribution of impacts, and the non-health channels. All of these are promising areas for
future research.
3.2.1 Willingness to pay for environmental quality
A high health burden from environmental quality in developing countries does not directly
imply a high WTP. Instead, the studies reviewed n the previous subsection aim to describe
h￿(e) or ∆y￿(e, h). However, the WTP or utility associated with these changes is the relevant
parameter for the social planner (see equation 5) and central ingredient in the determination
of optimal policy.
Few studies attempt to develop revealed preference estimates of WTP for environmental
quality and/or health. Kremer et al. (2011) uses a randomized controlled trial to gener-
ate exogenous variation in water quality across springs in Western Kenya. They find that
households are only willing to pay about $11 per year for clean water, where WTP is calcu-
lated from rural wage rates and revealed willingness to walk to clean water. This translates
into a revealed preference value of a statistical life of USD2013 860, which is four orders
of magnitude lower than accepted VSL numbers in the United States.11 In addition, the
same households’ revealed WTP is substantially lower than the valuations they give in a
contingent valuation survey. Other studies that measure the WTP for health in developing
countries may oﬀer estimates of the appropriate valuation to assign to u￿(h). The empiri-
cal literature valuing improvements to health in developing countries is reviewed by Dupas
(2011) and is consistent with WTP well below that in developed countries.
Overall, the available evidence suggests that WTPe is low. It is an open question as to
whether individuals valuations are truly so low or whether they are a consequence of the
market failures discussed in 2.5. For example, the paucity of hedonic studies in developing
countries could reflect imperfections in the land and labor markets that make them ill-suited
for inference about WTP for environmental quality and health (although it surely also reflects
11Other estimates of VSL numbers for developing countries are highly variable depending on the method-
ology employed (see Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a summary and León and Miguel (2012) and Bhattacharya
et al. (2007) for examples of diﬀerent methods). Many revealed preference studies of VSL or WTP rely on
hedonic regressions to isolate the risk-price tradeoﬀ, which relies on assumptions of well functioning markets
that may not hold in developing country settings.
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the limited availability of high quality land price and labor market data). Even the Kremer
et al. (2011) study relies on market wages to convert walking time to monetary units, in
a setting where labor markets are highly imperfect. Our judgment is that there is hardly
a more important topic for future study than developing revealed preference measures of
WTP, which capture the aesthetic, health and/or income gains from environmental quality.
3.2.2 Willingness to pay for self protection
A larger number of studies measure WTP for self protection, which identifiesWTPs (equation
6) under a set of assumptions about household beliefs surrounding the health eﬀects of self
protection (h￿(s)). Berry, Fischer, and Guiteras (2011) estimate that the median WTP for
a water filter in Ghana ranges between $1.80 and $2.40, depending on how the valuation
was elicited. Overall, the filter appears to reduce self-reported diarrheal incidents after one
month of use by 8 to 14 percent. They find only weak evidence of a relationship between
WTP and self reported diarrheal reductions from the filter.
Willingness to pay for self protection may also vary within the household if the health
burden of poor environmental quality is unevenly distributed across household members.
Miller and Mobarak (2011) show that women in Bangladesh have a stronger preference for
low emissions cookstoves than do men. In the study setting, men often manage money
and women are liquidity constrained, such that many women who express a preference for
the low-emissions stove are unable to purchase it, while men are more likely to implement
their stated preferences. Pitt, Rosenzweig and Hussam (2010) also find meaningful gender
diﬀerences in the health impacts of indoor air pollution and show that status within the
household is an important determinant of exposure. Thus, household-level measures of WTP
may not accurately capture within-household heterogeneities. Both Berry et al. (2011) and
Miller and Mobarak (2011) measure WTP for a (unfamiliar) product that aﬀects experienced
environmental quality, yet neither measures WTP for the ultimate change in environmental
quality or health outcomes or beliefs about how the technology will aﬀect health.
3.3 Existing evidence on the explanations for poor environmental
quality
The limited evidence on WTP for environmental quality in developing countries suggests
extremely low valuations. While more evidence is needed, this finding raises questions about
the underlying causes of low WTP. In addition, while low WTP is a suﬃcient condition for
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poor environmental quality in developing countries, it is not the only possible explanation.
Next, we turn to the evidence on each of four possible explanations for poor environmental
quality in developing countries, including why WTP might be low.
3.3.1 Explanation 1: High marginal utility of consumption
Recall from equation 5 that WTP for environmental quality is determined not only by the
endowment of environmental quality but also by the marginal utility of income. Increasing
income or wealth may increase WTP for environmental goods as the marginal utility of
consumption decreases. An ideal experiment would measure how WTP for environmental
quality changes with an exogenous change in income. However, most experiments generate
only short run shifts in income, and it may be challenging to find a quasi-experimental design
that credibly identifies the eﬀects of permanent income shocks.
The three studies that are most relevant to the relationship between income and WTP
provide mixed correlational evidence. Jalan and Somanathan (2008) document higher ex-
penditures on water quality among households in urban India with more assets. Consistent
with this result, Kremer et al. (2011) find that households with more education or assets are
more willing to walk to access improved water sources. On the other hand, Berry, Fischer and
Guiteras (2011) find no correlation between revealed WTP for water purification technology
and assets. The relationship between income and WTP in all of these studies is correlational,
and further research on the topic will help determine whether the high marginal utility of
consumption that accompanies very low incomes drives low WTP for environmental quality.
As suggested by the conceptual framework, higher incomes might be associated with
both higher WTP for environmental quality but also larger impacts on the environment (if
a￿(c) > 0). Several recent papers provide evidence that as incomes in developing countries
increase, there is a negative causal impact on environmental quality. Plausibly exogenous
variation in income to estimate these impacts is generated through a randomized cash transfer
program in Mexico in the studies by Alix-Garcia et al. (2013) and Gertler et al. (2011).
Alix-Garcia et al. (2013) find that the additional income associated with the Oportunidades
program increased deforestation due to higher consumption of land-intensive goods, such as
beef. Their study implements a community level regression discontinuity design based on
the rules that determine program eligibility to study deforestation as measured by satellite
images. They combine this community level analysis with household survey measures of
consumption from the randomized pilot phase of the program.
Gertler et al. (2011) use a diﬀerent source of identification under the same program to
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find a similar impact on environmentally harmful consumption. In their case, the outcome
of interest is the purchase of energy-intensive durable goods, specifically refrigerators, and
they use a combination of the random variation of when communities were phased in to
the program and household-level variation in the income flow due to household structure.12
They find that the income shock of the transfer increased refrigerator purchases, and there-
fore household energy consumption, with the largest eﬀects for households that received
the income over a short period of time. They use these empirical results to simulate dif-
ferent development pathways, and provide the insight that economic growth that benefits
the poor increases energy consumption and the related negative externalities more than less
progressive patterns of growth.
3.3.2 Explanation 2: High marginal costs
Costs of improving environmental quality are aﬀected by the capacity to design, implement
or enforce environmental policy and by the relationship between environmental quality im-
provements and other investments in the economy.13 Empirical evidence on the magnitude of
c￿(∆e) is important for solving the social planner’s maximization problem, and high marginal
cost is a suﬃcient explanation for why environmental quality is so poor in developing coun-
tries. Many countries have tough environmental regulations on the books, yet have trouble
achieving their environmental goals (Greenstone and Hanna 2013), potentially because of
the high costs of doing so.
High costs of improving environmental quality that are driven by poor policy design
and implementation do not imply that marginal abatement costs in developing countries are
high. In fact, where existing policies are lax, marginal abatement costs may be relatively
low. However, evidence on the marginal cost of pollution abatement in developing countries
is scarce. Recent research in the United States has begun to compare marginal abatement
costs across sources to identify the true costs of pollution abatement (Fowlie et al. 2012).
Similar research in developing country settings would provide a more complete picture of the
costs of improving environmental quality in developing countries and across countries, which
is particularly relevant for global pollutants such as greenhouse gases (see section 4). In
developing countries, poor policy design may target actions at the high end of the marginal
abatement cost curve, and poor implementation capacity may result in missed economies of
12The transfer amount diﬀered by gender and grade of school-aged children.
13Where state intervention fails, collective action or private provision of public goods may still improve
environmental quality. There is a large literature in both economics and political science on this topic, much
of it using case studies (see Ostrom (2000) for a review).
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scale associated with the centralized provision of environmental quality. The result is high
marginal costs of environmental quality improvements.
A lack of scientific expertise, poor policy guidance or low levels of accountability may
result in poorly chosen policy objectives or misdirected regulations. A striking case of this is
demonstrated in Field, Glennerster and Hussam (2011), which shows that a successful arsenic
information campaign led to worsened health by encouraging households to switch from
arsenic-contaminated deep wells to surface water contaminated with biological pathogens
that cause diarrhea in children. Taking advantage of the quasi-experimental distribution of
below-ground arsenic, the authors document that on net the arsenic campaign led to a 27
percent increase in infant and child mortality. The paper also highlights the challenge of
multiple environmental risks, and an inability of households or policy makers to accurately
rank them.
Unanticipated eﬀects of environmental regulations also arise through agents’ responses
to the policies. For example, Davis (2008) finds that a policy to restrict driving in Mexico
City according to license plate number had no eﬀect on pollution levels. Instead, the number
of registered cars increased, presumably because consumers could bypass the regulation by
purchasing an additional car with diﬀerent plates.14 In Mexico City, implementation of
the policy and the costs to households are estimated at over 300 million dollars annually
and generated no improvements in environmental quality. Policy implementers also have
incentives to exploit loopholes in policy design. Duflo et al. (2013) study the performance
of third-party auditors used by the environmental regulator in Gujarat, India to identify
industrial plants that exceed the emissions standards. When plants choose and pay the
auditors, as is the norm, they find that the system is corrupted with auditors systematically
reporting plant emissions just below the standard, although true emissions were typically
higher. The social costs of these policy-making oversights are large.
Poor targeting also increases the marginal cost of environmental quality improvements.
Another program in Mexico that subsidized the purchase of energy eﬃcient appliances per-
formed very poorly, actually increasing energy consumption for some appliances, while ex
ante engineering estimates indicated that the program would pay for itself in energy savings
(Davis et al. 2012). The extreme overestimate of the program’s eﬀectiveness was due to a
combination of changes in the types of appliances purchase, usage patterns and the inclusion
of many inframarginal households (Boomhower and Davis 2013; Davis et al. 2012).
14Similar driving restrictions have been introduced and evaluated in other cities including Beijing, Santiago
and São Paulo, with mixed success (Gallego et al. 2012; Lin et al. 2011; Viard and Fu 2011).
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In settings with low enforcement capacity and heterogeneous benefits from environmental
quality, decentralization may pose a useful solution for improving monitoring and account-
ability (Bardhan 2002; Lemos and Agrawal 2006). Decentralization of policies for environ-
mental quality may therefore improve local welfare, while generating an incentive to divert
pollution to neighboring jurisdictions. Lipscomb and Mobarak (2011) use changes in district
boundaries to generate evidence from Brazil that, within a jurisdiction, pollution levels are
highest where the river is close to entering a downstream jurisdiction. Without central-
ized enforcement capacity, these types of environmental externalities may go un-penalized.
While decentralization may lower the costs of improving environmental quality locally, it
may simply shift these costs to other jurisdictions if pollutants are mobile.
Other investments in the economy, by policy-makers, firms and individuals, aﬀect the
marginal cost of improving environmental quality, and privately optimal investment choices
change in response to new environmental regulations or improvements in environmental
quality. For example, the marginal costs of improving environmental quality may appear
higher to the social planner if individuals treat public and private provision of environmental
quality as substitutes. While public (or privatized) provision itself may improve eﬃciency,
it will not improve experienced environmental quality if compensatory changes in behavior
reduce private investments in self protection. Bennett (2012) studies such a case in the
Philippines and argues that improved water supply infrastructure resulted in lower private
sanitation investments. Consistent with this finding, Berry, Fischer and Guiteras (2011)
show a negative correlation between access to an improved water source year-round and
WTP for an in-home water filter. This suggestive evidence on the substitutability of public
and private investments does not imply that public investments are ineﬃcient, just that
the marginal costs may be underestimated if the relationship between public and private
investments are ignored. Further research on the interaction between public and private
resource management and environmental quality provision is needed.
Complementarities between environmental policy and infrastructure may also aﬀect the
marginal costs of environmental quality improvements. For example, centralized infrastruc-
ture has the potential to resolve common pool resource challenges in settings where the fixed
cost of private resource extraction is high, by creating a feasible setting for marginal cost
pricing (Sekhri 2011). Poor infrastructure can further hurt consumers by limiting competi-
tion among service providers (Ryan 2012a). Low levels of competition potentially undermine
incentives for reducing the marginal cost of environmental quality improvements. Consis-
tent with this, Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2005) show that better firm incentives
22
associated with privatization improved water quality and health outcomes in Buenos Aires.
Their study oﬀers compelling evidence on the positive health eﬀects of improved infrastruc-
ture to deliver environmental quality. More generally, how firms respond to environmental
regulations depend not only on the costs imposed by the regulation but also on how it aﬀects
their competitors. Lipscomb (2008) examines the response of firms in India to an increase in
enforcement and finds that firms adjust away from the production of dirty output, though
profits increase in polluting sectors where competition was reduced as a result of the change
in regulation.
Other evidence is starting to accrue about the types of policies that generate better en-
vironmental outcomes at reasonable cost. For example, policies that receive broad popular
support may manage to avoid some of the evasion that undermines Mexico City’s pollution
control eﬀorts (documented by Davis (2008) and Oliva (2010)). Of course, the regulations
with broad popular support may also be the ones that impose little burden or generate large
benefits for aﬀected households. Greenstone and Hanna (2013) compile a comprehensive
dataset of pollution levels and policy changes in India and find that the most successful
policies are the ones with a broad internal base of support rather than those led by bureau-
crats and institutions. This translates to significant policy impacts on ambient air pollution
but not on water quality, where the policy process was less transparent. The Duflo et al.
(2013) study of third-party auditors described above finds that auditors report on pollution
emissions more truthfully when the audit market is restructured to mitigate incentives for
conflicts of interest. Further, plants reduce their pollution emissions, presumably because
they are concerned about sanctions from the regulator who is receiving substantially more
reliable information on which plants violate the standards.
Policies designed explicitly to overcome information asymmetries and improve targeting,
such as the auction-based allocation of land use subsidies studied in a field experiment
by Jack (2013), may help lower the cost of policies that improve environmental quality in
developing countries.15 In a diﬀerent setting, Foster and Guiterrez (2009; 2011) investigate
whether voluntary environmental programs can be eﬀective, potentially addressing poor
government enforcement through policy design. They rely on satellite measures of pollution
15Other studies highlight the importance of targeting for decreasing the information rents in payments
for environmental services studies. Arriagada et al. (2012) use diﬀerence and diﬀerence with pre-matching
on observables to evaluate the impacts of land use subsidies in one region of Costa Rica. They find larger
impacts than do previous analyses of the Costa Rica program (e.g. Pfaﬀ et al. 2008) and suggest that the
diﬀerence is due to superior targeting in their region of study. See also a recent paper by Alix-Garcia et al.
(2012).
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concentrations and use an instrumental variables strategy to show that participation in a
voluntary pollution reduction program in Mexico led to a 16 percent decrease in pollution-
driven infant mortality. This reduction is due largely to the fact that participating firms
underwent a voluntary audit in exchange for a two year inspection exemption. This allowed
the regulator to better target inspections, leading to pollution reductions by uncertified firms.
These findings suggest that policies that oﬀer some information revelation component can
improve how regulations are targeted, which may be particularly important for cost eﬀective
environmental quality improvements where monitoring and enforcement capacity is weak.
3.3.3 Explanation 3: Political economy and rent seeking behavior
The conceptual framework distinguishes between high marginal costs in the first best, and
political economy factors that distort the social planner’s maximization problem. Empiri-
cal studies on the eﬀects of political economy considerations and rent seeking behavior on
environmental quality provide estimates of these distortions, which may take the form of
an additional parameter in the welfare equation. For example, the policy maker’s and/or
bureaucrat’s own utility may enter the function that determines policy or there may be
unequal welfare weights assigned to specific groups. The supply or withholding of environ-
mental quality by the social planner may be one form of aﬀecting distributional outcomes
across groups, as shown by Feler and Henderson (2011) for water connections in Brazil. On
the other hand, utility weights in the social planner’s function may also help correct for an
unequal burden of poor environmental quality in developing countries.
There is an emerging empirical literature that finds evidence for rent seeking as an ex-
planation for poor environmental quality. Oliva (2010) studies a pollution control policy
in Mexico City’s and finds extensive corruption in the smog emissions testing program for
private vehicles. She uses data from smog testing centers to implement both structural and
reduced form analyses. The results suggest that at least 9.6 percent of old-car owners paid
bribes of $20 to circumvent the regulations.
Among elected oﬃcials, rent-seeking opportunities can also undermine policy implemen-
tation. Compelling evidence to this eﬀect is presented by Burgess et al. (2012), who find that
corruption increases deforestation in Indonesia. A combination of satellite imagery, data on
electoral cycles, oil prices and district boundaries are used to show that in years when oil
revenues are low, illegal logging increases. Enforcement of environmental policies (in this
case, forest laws) may therefore suﬀer when natural resources are viewed as a source of rents.
On the other hand, new evidence indicates that improving incentives for bureaucrats can
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both reduce corruption and improve monitoring and enforcement outcomes in developing
countries (for example, Duflo et al. 2012). It is apparent that at least in some settings part
of the cost of environmental quality improvement is therefore increased by rent seeking and
other corrupt behavior.
Firms may respond to regulatory settings distorted by opportunities for rent capture by
modifying their objective function in ways that undermine competitiveness and reduce envi-
ronmental quality. For example, McRae (2009) describes the impact of government subsidies
for public services, sewerage and electricity, which undermines firm incentives to improve in-
frastructure quality in Colombia. Because firms receive transfers from the government in
lieu of payments from customers, they have little incentive to improve infrastructure (and
therefore cost recovery) themselves. The “grabbing hand” model of government suggests
that corruption and state owned enterprises discourage entrepreneurship and distort firm
entry and exit decisions (Shleifer and Vishny 2002). Some of the low observed total factor
productivity among firms in countries such as India and China may be a direct result of
government intervention or other market failures that distort resources away from the most
productive firms (Hsieh and Klenow 2009). To the extent that competition increases the
eﬃciency of the average firm, the pollution intensity of production may also be higher when
rent seeking politicians set regulation.16
While utility weights in the social planner’s maximization problem are most often asso-
ciated with handouts and political favors (e.g., Fisman 2001), they may also be serve the
function of correcting socially undesirable distributions of the burden of poor environmental
quality. Within the household, women and children are more likely to bear the cost of in-
door air pollution and poor water quality (as discussed in Section 3.2.2). And within many
developing country settings, poor and marginalized groups are often described as dependent
on natural resources either as a primary source of income or for consumption smoothing
(Hassan et al. 2005). Thus the burden of poor environmental quality may fall disproportion-
ately on these already vulnerable groups. Whether such outcomes are avoided may depend
on explicit weights in the social welfare function, which carry their own political economy
considerations.17 Further research on the causal relationship between environmental quality,
16Ryan (2012a) shows related evidence that reduced competition harms electricity provision in India.
Dasgupta et al. (1998) show evidence from Brazil and Mexico that small firms are both more prevalent and
have much higher pollution levels in poorer regions, though these results can be partially explained by the
sectors in which small firms operate.
17See, for example, the extensive discussion of indigenous rights to resource use in the UN’s State of the
World’s Indigenous People (UN 2009)
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social status and economic vulnerability will help inform open questions about the incidence
of the pollution burden in developing countries.
3.3.4 Explanation 4: Market failures and behavioral biases
If the assumptions of the first best are relaxed, then market failures may bias WTP (MB￿)
away from its theoretical value (MB∗). In particular, information, land, capital, and risk
markets will aﬀect WTP for environmental quality. Empirical evidence on the topic is scarce,
though the potential to evaluate the environmental eﬀects of interventions that improve
markets in developing countries is high.
Some evidence suggests that information provision can have substantial eﬀects on WTP
and on investments in self protection, which implies that information market failures may
move revealed preference measures away from the first best. In a randomized experiment,
Jalan and Somanathan (2008) provide Delhi residents with information about the quality of
their tap water and find a significant change in expenditures following the treatment. Indi-
viduals who learn that their water is dirty are 11 percentage points more likely to purchase
in-home treatment and overall expenditures on in-home treatment increase by 6.5 percent.
Madajewicz et al. (2007) also find a significant response to information about water qual-
ity in Bangladesh. Another study in Bangladesh suggests that the eﬀect of information is
sensitive to how it is delivered (Bennear et al. 2012). The authors show that providing house-
holds with complicated information about well contamination leads to suboptimal decisions
in water choice.
These studies relate to a large literature in development economics that describes the
information and learning challenges associated with technology adoption (for a review of
the technology adoption literature, see Foster and Rosenzweig 2010). A household that has
never experienced clean water may not know the benefits of experimenting with technolo-
gies or behaviors that improve water quality. To the extent that peers and neighbors oﬀer
transferrable information through their own actions, social learning is more likely to occur
(Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Conley and Udry 2010). A trusted government agency may be
able to help overcome information failures in developing countries, however individuals may
not trust oﬃcial information sources – in some case for good reason as shown in the study
by Field et al. (2011) described above. One reason for low measured WTP in developing
countries may therefore be a lack of clear and trustworthy information about the benefits of
improved environmental quality.
Evidence on the eﬀects of market failures other than information are less common. In
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one existing study in Rwanda, Ali et al. (2011) use a spatial regression discontinuity design
to measure the impacts of a land titling program on a number of outcomes, including in-
vestments in soil fertility. They show that more secure land title increased investments in
environmental quality, particularly among female headed households, for whom the change
in tenure security was likely to be most dramatic.
Missing capital markets may also reduce incentives for investments with long run pay-
oﬀs, which includes many environmental quality investments. On the other hand, credit
constraints may inhibit investment in environmentally-damaging production and consump-
tion. For example, Assunção et al. (2013) show that a restriction on credit in Brazil lowered
deforestation rates, likely by decreasing land-intensive livestock investments. These results
are consistent with Alix-Garcia et al.’s (2013) finding that income transfers under Oportu-
nidades led to greater deforestation in Mexico.
Because land, risk and capital market failures are prevalent in developing countries, more
evidence is needed about how these constraints aﬀect the WTP for environmental quality,
in particular, the size and direction of the gap between MB￿ and MB∗, and the costs
of narrowing the gap. The substantial literature in development economics documenting
plausibly exogenous sources of variation in market function should help facilitate future
research.
Though studies of the behavioral eﬀects of defaults have proliferated in other contexts,
they have received relatively little attention for environmental decision making.18 Devoto et
al. (2012) use a randomized experiment to study the take up and impacts of a subsidized
program to connect households to the municipal water system in Morocco. They find that
small administrative barriers have a large impact on take up, and that households who
received tapped water experience a substantial improvement in quality of life and mental
health, in spite of the lack of health impacts. The behavioral implications of defaults and
cognitive depletion associated with the constant active decisions that residents of developing
countries must make to raise their experienced environmental quality may partly explain
low WTP. Further research on this and other areas of behavioral economics are a promising
direction for future research, which can help identify the gap between MB￿ and MB∗ in the
social planner’s welfare function.
18A developed country exception is Lofgren et al. (2011), who study the eﬀect of defaults on the purchase
of carbon oﬀsets.
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3.4 Theory and Macroeconomics
The majority of the papers reviewed thus far are solidly within the realm of applied microe-
conomics. However, as we suggest in Section 3.1, new developments in theory and modeling
facilitate empirical tests at the intersection of environmental and development economics.
At the same time, the challenges laid out in this paper present opportunities for new applied
theory, which will help advance understanding of the challenges at the core of this nascent
sub-field.
An exhaustive review of theoretical progress relevant to environmental quality in devel-
oping countries is well beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we highlight three areas
where new applied theory is emerging or may be particularly important for advancing our
understanding of environment and development issues. First, as Section 2.5 makes clear,
the market failures of environmental economics may interact with the market failures of
development economics. While substantial theoretical literatures describe each in isolation
(see Stiglitz (1989); De Janvry et al. (1991) for seminal works in development economics and
Baumol and Oates (1988); Cornes (1996) for environmental economics), the implications of
these interactions require additional modeling to derive specific predictions. Second, envi-
ronmental economics has benefitted enormously from the application of theory and methods
from industrial economics to questions of optimal environmental regulation and pollution
control (e.g., Fowlie 2009, 2010; Ryan 2012b). Extending this work to developing countries,
where contracts are diﬃcult to enforce, information asymmetries are potentially large and
corruption aﬀects the entry and exit of firms, oﬀers rich grounds for new innovation in ap-
plied theory. Finally, behavioral economics continues to generate new theories relevant to
individual decision making in developing countries (e.g., Bertrand et al. (2004); Banerjee
and Mullainathan (2010); Bryan et al. (2010)). Environmental applications contain many of
the ingredients for interesting behavioral theory – low probability outcomes, social spillovers
and future impacts – and more complete descriptions of individual and household decision
making will help the field of environmental and development economics progress.
Additionally, there is a small but growing and insightful macroeconomics literature at the
intersection of environment and development. Recent papers by Huetel and Fischer (2013)
and Smith (2012) provide an overview of recent work and potential research directions at
the intersection of traditional macroeconomics and environmental economics. Huetel and
Fischer describe a nascent literature on economic growth that considers induced innovation
and path dependency for environmental technologies. For example, recent theoretical work
by Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Hemous (2012) considers the eﬀects of carbon taxes and
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research subsidies on innovation in a single economy or two-economy model, respectively.
The models presented in both papers find support for the use of research subsidies in clean
sectors, particularly when subsidies in a rich country generate technological spillovers for
a poor country. A number of related papers have followed this work, and are described
by Huetel and Fischer (2013) in their review. The directed technological change literature
is not the only macroeconomic sub-field that has embraced environment-development or
environment-growth topics. Studies that use integrated assessment models of climate change
necessarily consider growth-environment feedbacks (see Kelly and Kolstad (1999); Nordhaus
(2011); Hassler and Krusell (2012)) and the literature on trade and the environment (for
example, Copeland and Taylor (2005); Shapiro (2012)) has a history of work on pollution
havens and environmental trade barriers that aﬀect developing countries.
4 Climate change
We believe that climate change is the most important topic at the intersection of environ-
mental and development economics. It is often referred to as an existential threat and this
is literally true for some developing countries (e.g., parts of Bangladesh are at risk of disap-
pearing due to sea level rise). More broadly, the greatest damages are projected to occur in
today’s developing countries, especially those in the tropics. At the same time, today’s de-
veloping countries are expected to be the largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the coming
decades due to their projected growth in GDP and energy consumption (see Gertler et al.
(2011); Wolfram et al. (2012)); China is currently the largest emitter of CO2 in the world
and their emissions exceeded US emissions by 50 percent in 2012 (PBL 2012).
Climate change is defined by many of the issues raised in Section 2, and each of the
potential barriers to optimal policy are even greater than they are for conventional pollu-
tants. In the climate case, production and consumption choices generate global externalities
(a(c, s) ￿= aS(c, s)), rather than just externalities across households in the same city, region,
or even country. Further, the benefits of mitigation are both uncertain and in the future.
The result is any one actor has little incentive to curb growth in the name of mitigation and
no single government or entity has authority over all emitters. In these respects, climate
change is the standard problem of externalities and public goods on steroids.
This paper’s four explanations for the poor state of environmental quality in develop-
ing countries all pose serious challenges to any global eﬀort to significantly limit climate
change. First, developing countries are likely to place a relatively low present value on cur-
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rent greenhouse reductions. This is because the marginal utility of current consumption in
these countries is very high, relative to the marginal utility of future consumption due to
their low income levels and fast rates of growth. Further, today’s developed countries are
richer than the developing ones and experiencing slower growth, which means they are likely
to place a higher value on current greenhouse gas reductions. Thus both the high current
marginal utility of consumption in developing countries and the diﬀerence in the marginal
rates of substitution between current and future consumption make it challenging for rich
and poor countries to find common ground on the value of carbon reductions, at least without
substantial transfers that have their own political challenges (Becker et al. 2010; Deshpande
and Greenstone 2010). Second, the marginal costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions are
substantial. In the transportation sector, there is not currently a viable large-scale alter-
native to petroleum and in the electricity sector recent estimates suggest that the private
costs of zero carbon sources of electricity can be 2-3 times more expensive than electricity
generated from fossil fuels (Greenstone and Looney 2012).
In addition to these first best reasons (i.e., potentially low benefits and high costs) that
slowing climate change may be diﬃcult, this paper’s other explanations for poor environmen-
tal quality in developing countries are highly relevant. With respect to the third explanation,
political economy and rent seeking forces can easily undermine eﬀorts to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. It is diﬃcult to monitor carbon emissions and this opens the door to claimed
reductions that exceed actual reductions. Indeed, the market for carbon oﬀsets has been
greatly undermined by overstated claims about impacts. Finally, a series of market failures
may cause revealed WTP for carbon reductions in developing countries to diﬀer from first
best WTP. For example, incomplete credit markets restrict opportunities to engage in long
term mitigation projects and incomplete insurance markets complicate eﬀorts to protect
oneself from uncertain climate damages. Furthermore, climate change seems almost to have
been conceived by behavioral economists as an ideal setting for behavioral biases;, it involves
low probability events, impacts that are in the future, and trade-oﬀs between current and
future generations. There is substantial opportunity for important research about the roles
of each of these four explanations in shaping climate mitigation policies.
It is against this background that research on the impacts of climate change and op-
portunities for adaptation have begun to emerge. A growing literature aims to estimate
the likely economic impacts of climate change and shows projected increases in agricultural
losses, storm damages, civil conflicts, and morbidity and mortality rates (Burke et al. 2011;
Deschênes et al. 2009; Deschênes and Greenstone 2011; Feng et al. 2010, 2012; Schlenker and
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Lobell 2010; Graﬀ-Zivin and Neidell 2012; IPCC 2001). The available evidence indicates
these losses are all likely to be of a greater magnitude in developing countries, where the
resources available for investment in self protection (adaptation) are limited. For example,
Burgess, Deschenes, Donaldson and Greenstone (2011) provide evidence that climate change
may sharply reduce agricultural yields and increase mortality rates in rural India. They also
compare results from rural areas to urban areas and to developed countries to show that
those with opportunities for self protection are able to mitigate the negative health impacts.
A recent line of research indicates that that adaptation does occur but not without its
own drawbacks. Interestingly, air conditioners can play an significant role in moderating
the eﬀects of extreme weather on mortality (Barreca et al. 2012; Graﬀ Zivin et al. 2013).
However, they are often run with CO2 intensive electricity and do little to protect against
other climate-related risks such as storm frequency. For example, Davis and Gertler (2013)
document the relationship between temperature and energy consumption in Mexico, and
show that long term weather patterns drive air conditioner adoption. Additionally, areas
that experience more regular storms appear to experience less damage than do less well-
adapted places when hit by comparable events, though adaptation is never suﬃcient to shrink
damages to zero (Hsiang and Narita 2012; Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang 2012). Farmers also
appear able to adapt to changes in climate, with some evidence from extended periods of
drought that may better approximate the eﬀects of climate change than studies that rely on
short-run weather shocks. By adjusting both crop choice and land under irrigation, farmers
in India mitigate losses due drought, however, only 14 percent of the substantial decline in
profits are oﬀset through adaptation (Taraz 2012). Moreover, migration may also oﬀer a
viable adaptation strategy (Boustan et al. 2012), though external migration incentives may
be necessary even when the costs of not moving are very high (Bryan et al. 2012).
Evidence to date suggests that climate change is already underway and that adaptation
has begun. The considerable economic and political challenges to global mitigation programs
underscore that there is a great need for new research that better quantifies the likely costs
of climate change and that identifies and assesses the eﬃciency of potential mitigation and
adaptation strategies. Beyond the societal value, this research has the potential to improve
understanding about economic behavior more broadly.
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5 Discussion and conclusion
The intersection of environmental and development economics oﬀers a wealth of questions
that are of interest to economists and policymakers. What is the eﬀect of environmental qual-
ity on economic development in developing countries? On health? On productivity? How
does economic development and changing patterns of consumption and governance aﬀect
environmental quality? What are the political economy factors that shape this relationship?
Many of these questions are poorly understood, and our aim in this article has been to
highlight a framework for research in the emerging field of envirodevonomics. Our concep-
tual framework oﬀers one approach to considering a fundamental puzzle: if environmental
quality is so bad in developing countries, then why is WTP so low? Is it because, for the
very poor, the marginal utility of consumption dominates utility gains from improved envi-
ronmental quality or because abatement costs are high? Or is WTP high, yet policy makers
fail to express the preferences of their constituents in policy design and implementation?
Alternatively is it because the market failures that are so prevalent in developing countries
also distort WTP?
The empirical literature summarized in Section 3 suggests that all of these explanations
may be at play, however further research is necessary to answer these questions definitively,
noting that the answers may vary across settings. In the remainder of the conclusion, we
outline some areas where we believe additional research would be particularly valuable.
1. What is the WTP for environmental quality and what factors determine this?
(a) How much are people willing to pay for improvements in environmental quality
in developing countries?
(b) How are their valuations aﬀected by the presence of market failures, poor informa-
tion, weak governance and property rights, multiple risks, and poor policy design,
weak implementation and rent seeking.
(c) How do people’s decision heuristics and biases aﬀect their willingness to use im-
proved resources or technologies?
(d) How does access to credit for energy eﬃciency investments and investments in
renewable energy sources aﬀect individuals’ and firms’ decisions?
(e) Does worse environmental quality increase the variability of income? Do vulner-
able groups use natural resources as a source of insurance? What is the corre-
sponding WTP for this source of insurance?
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2. What are the costs and benefits of policies to improve environmental quality and access
to energy?
(a) How large are the health benefits that result from improvements in water and air
quality? Which programs achieve these benefits most cost-eﬀectively?
(b) Can providing information to the public change their behavior and exposure to
environmental risks?
(c) What factors determine whether environmental regulations are eﬀective in devel-
oping countries?
(d) How do issues of corruption and a government’s capacity to enforce regulation
influence the impact of specific environmental policies?
(e) How much are people willing to pay for access to reliable energy sources? Or for
reliable clean energy sources?
3. What policies can be eﬀective for climate mitigation and adaptation?
(a) How do the costs of abating a ton of carbon emissions compare across diﬀerent
policies?
i. What is the cost of abating a ton of carbon through energy eﬃcient invest-
ments for consumers?
ii. What is the cost through energy eﬃciency policies targeting manufacturers,
especially small and medium sized ones?
iii. What is the cost of abating a ton of carbon through payments for ecosystem
services?
iv. Through market-based emissions trading systems?
(b) What factors or design elements cause people in developing countries to make
energy eﬃciency investments?
(c) Do transfers of funds or technologies from developed countries crowd out devel-
oping country investments in mitigation and adaptation?
(d) Will clean energy products that work in the lab have the same results when real
people use them in real world settings?
(e) What programs or policies can best protect vulnerable populations, like children,
the elderly, and smallholder farmers, against the eﬀects climate change?
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These and many other topics are increasingly feasible areas for economic research, as data
quality and availability improve. But even more importantly, finding reliable answers to
these questions will advance economic understanding and inform policy, with the potential
to enormously impact human welfare.
34
References
Acemoglu, D., P. Aghion, L. Bursztyn, and D. Hemous (2012). The environment and directed
technical change. The American Economic Review 102 (1), 131–66.
Ali, D. A., K. Deininger, and M. Goldstein (2011). Environmental and gender impacts of
land tenure regularization in Africa: Pilot evidence from Rwanda. World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper .
Alix-Garcia, J., C. McIntosh, K. R. Sims, and J. R. Welch (2013). The ecological foot-
print of poverty alleviation: Evidence from Mexico’s Opportunidades program. Review of
Economics and Statistics 95, 417–435.
Alix-Garcia, J., K. Sims, P. Yanez-Pagans, V. Radeloﬀ, and E. Shapiro (2012). Two dimen-
sional evaluation: The environmental and socioeconomic impacts of Mexico’s payments
for hydrological services program. Unpublished manuscript .
Almond, D., Y. Chen, M. Greenstone, and H. Li (2009). Winter heating or clean air?
Unintended impacts of China’s Huai River policy. The American Economic Review: Papers
& Proceedings 99 (2), 184–190.
Andreoni, J. and A. Levinson (2001). The simple analytics of the environmental Kuznets
curve. Journal of Public Economics 80 (2), 269–286.
Anttila-Hughes, J. and S. Hsiang (2012). Destruction, divestment and death: Economic and
human losses following environmental disaster. Working Paper .
Aragón, F. M. and J. P. Rud (2013). Modern industries, pollution and agricultural produc-
tivity: Evidence from Ghana. Working Paper .
Arceo-Gomez, E. O., R. Hanna, and P. Oliva (2012). Does the eﬀect of pollution on infant
mortality diﬀer between developing and developed countries? Evidence from Mexico City.
Working Paper .
Arriagada, R., P. Ferraro, E. Sills, S. Pattanayak, and S. Cordero-Sancho (2012). Do pay-
ments for environmental services aﬀect forest cover? A farm-level evaluation from Costa
Rica. Land Economics 88 (2), 382Ð399.
Assunção, J., C. Gandour, R. Rocha, and R. Rocha (2013). Does credit aﬀect deforestation?
Evidence from a rural credit policy in the Brazilian Amazon. Working Paper .
35
Banerjee, A. and S. Mullainathan (2010). The shape of temptation: Implications for the
economic lives of the poor. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bardhan, P. (2002). Decentralization of governance and development. The Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives 16 (4), 185–205.
Bardhan, P. and C. Udry (1999). Development Microeconomics. Oxford University Press.
Barreca, A., K. Clay, O. Deschenes, M. Greenstone, and J. Shapiro (2012). Adapting to
climate change: The remarkable decline in the U.S. temperature-mortality relationship
over the 20th century. Working Paper .
Baumol, W. J. and W. E. Oates (1988). The theory of environmental policy. Cambridge
University Press (Cambridge Cambridgeshire and New York).
Becker, G. S., K. M. Murphy, and R. H. Topel (2010). On the economics of climate policy.
The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 10 (2).
Bennear, L., A. Tarozzi, A. Pfaﬀ, S. Balasubramanya, K. Matin Ahmed, and A. van Geen
(2012). Impact of a randomized controlled trial in arsenic risk communication on household
water-source choices in Bangladesh. Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment .
Bennett, D. (2012). Does clean water make you dirty? Journal of Human Resources 47 (1),
146–173.
Berry, J., G. Fischer, and R. Guiteras (2011). Eliciting and utilizing willingness to pay:
Evidence from field trials in northern Ghana. Working Paper .
Bertrand, M., S. Mullainathan, and E. Shafir (2004). A behavioral-economics view of poverty.
The American Economic Review 94 (2), 419–423.
Bhattacharya, S., A. Alberini, and M. L. Cropper (2007). The value of mortality risk
reductions in delhi, india. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 34, 21–47.
Blackman, A. (2010). Alternative pollution control policies in developing countries. Review
of Environmental Economics and Policy 4 (2), 234–253.
Boomhower, J. and L. Davis (2013). Free riders and the high cost of energy-eﬃciency
subsidies. Working Paper .
36
Boustan, L., M. Kahn, and P. Rhode (2012). Moving to higher ground: Migration response to
natural disasters in the early twentieth century. The American Economic Review: Papers
& Proceedings 102, 238–244.
Brainerd, E. and N. Menon (2012). Seasonal eﬀects of water quality on infant and child
health. Working Paper .
Bryan, G., S. Chowdhury, and A. Mobarak (2012). Seasonal migration and risk aversion.
Working Paper .
Bryan, G., D. Karlan, and S. Nelson (2010). Commitment devices. Annual Review of
Economics 2 (1), 671–698.
Burgess, R., O. Deschenes, D. Donaldson, and M. Greenstone (2011). Weather and death in
India. Working Paper .
Burgess, R., M. Hansen, B. A. Olken, P. Potapov, and S. Sieber (2012). The political
economy of deforestation in the tropics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (4),
1707–1754.
Burke, M., J. Dykema, D. Lobell, E. Miguel, and S. Satyanath (2011). Incorporating climate
uncertainty into estimates of climate change impacts, with applications to U.S. and African
agriculture. Working Paper .
Cao, J., R. Garbaccio, and M. S. Ho (2009). China’s 11th five-year plan and the environment:
Reducing so2 emissions. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 3 (2), 231–250.
Caroll, G., J. Choi, D. Laibson, B. Madrian, and A. Metrick (2009). Optimal defaults and
active decisions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, 505–540.
Chay, K. Y. and M. Greenstone (2003). The impact of air pollution on infant mortality: Evi-
dence from geographic variation in pollution shocks induced by a recession. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 118 (3), 1121–1167.
Chen, Y., A. Ebenstein, M. Greenstone, and H. Li (2013). Evidence on the impact of
sustained exposure to air pollution on life expectancy from China/Õs Huai River policy.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (32), 12936–12941.
Chen, Y., G. Jin, N. Kumar, and G. Shi (2013). Gaming in air pollution data? Lessons from
China. Working Paper .
37
Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1–44.
Conley, T. and C. Udry (2010). Learning about a new technology: Pineapple in Ghana.
American Economic Review 100, 35–69.
Conning, J. and C. Udry (2007). Rural financial markets in developing countries. Handbook
of Agricultural Economics 3, 2857–2908.
Copeland, B. R. and M. S. Taylor (2005). Trade and the environment: Theory and evidence.
Princeton University Press.
Cornes, R. (1996). The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods. Cambridge
University Press.
Currie, J. and M. Neidell (2005). Air pollution and infant health: What can we learn from
California’s recent experience? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (3), 1003–1030.
Currie, J. and R. Walker (2011). Traﬃc congestion and infant health: Evidence from E-
ZPass. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3 (1), 65–90.
Dasgupta, P. (2009). The Place of Nature in Economic Development, Volume 5. Amsterdam:
North Holland.
Dasgupta, S., B. Laplante, H. Wang, and D. Wheeler (2002). Confronting the environmental
Kuznets curve. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (1), 147–168.
Dasgupta, S., R. Lucas, and D. Wheeler (1998). Small plants, pollution and poverty: New
evidence from Brazil and Mexico. Working Paper .
Davis, L., A. Fuchs, and P. Gertler (2012). Cash for coolers: Evaluating a large-scale
appliance replacement program in Mexico. Working Paper .
Davis, L. and P. Gertler (2013). The central role of air conditioning in the relationship
between climate and energy use. Working Paper .
Davis, L. W. (2008). The eﬀect of driving restrictions on air quality in Mexico City. Journal
of Political Economy 116 (1), 38–81.
De Janvry, A., M. Fafchamps, and E. Sadoulet (1991). Peasant household behaviour with
missing markets: Some paradoxes explained. The Economic Journal 101 (409), 1400–1417.
38
Deschênes, O. and M. Greenstone (2011). Climate change, mortality, and adaptation: Evi-
dence from annual fluctuations in weather in the US. American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics 3 (4), 152–185.
Deschênes, O., M. Greenstone, and J. Guryan (2009). Climate change and birth weight. The
American Economic Review , 211–217.
Deshpande, M. and M. Greenstone (2010). Comment on Ön the economics of climate policy¨:
Is climate change mitigation the ultimate arbitrage opportunity? The BE Journal of
Economic Analysis & Policy 10 (2), 20.
Devoto, F., E. Duflo, P. Dupas, W. Pariente, and V. Pons (2012). Happiness on tap: Piped
water adoption in urban Morocco. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4 (4),
68–99.
Dinkelman, T. (2011). The eﬀects of rural electrification on employment: New evidence from
South Africa. The American Economic Review 101 (7), 3078–3108.
Duflo, E. (2012, May). Human values and the design of the fight against poverty. Tanner
Lecture at Harvard University.
Duflo, E., M. Greenstone, R. Guiteras, and T. Clasen (2013). The short- and medium-run
impact of clean water and sanitation on diarrhea in rural India.
Duflo, E., M. Greenstone, R. Pande, and N. Ryan (2012). Truth-telling by third-party
auditors: Evidence from a randomized field experiment in India. Working Paper .
Duflo, E. and R. Pande (2007). Dams. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (2), 601–646.
Dupas, P. (2011). Health behavior in developing countries. Annual Review of Eco-
nomics 3 (1), 425–449.
Ebenstein, A. (2012). The consequences of industrialization: Evidence from water pollution
and digestive cancers in China. The Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (1).
Environmental Protection Agency (2010). Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses.
Feler, L. and J. Henderson (2011). Exlusionary policies in urban development: Under-
servicing migrant households in "Brazilian cities. Journal of Urban Economics 69, 253–
272.
39
Feng, S., A. Krueger, and M. Oppenheimer (2010). Linkages among climate change, crop
yields and Mexico-US cross-border migration. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 107 (32), 14257–14262.
Feng, S., M. Oppenheimer, and W. Schlenker (2012). Climate change, crop yields, and
internal migration in the United States. Working Paper .
Field, E., R. Glennerster, and R. Hussam (2011). Throwing the baby out with the drinking
water: Unintended consequences of arsenic mitigation eﬀorts in Bangladesh. Working
Paper .
Fisman, R. (2001). Estimating the value of political connections. The American Economic
Review 91 (4), 1095–1102.
Foster, A. and E. Gutierrez (2011). Direct and indirect eﬀects of voluntary certification:
Evidence from the Mexican Clean Industry Program. Working Paper .
Foster, A., E. Gutierrez, and N. Kumar (2009). Voluntary compliance, pollution levels, and
infant mortality in Mexico. The American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 99 (2),
191–197.
Foster, A. and M. Rosenzweig (2010). Microeconomics of technology adoption. Annual
Review of Economics 2 (1), 395–424.
Foster, A. D. and M. R. Rosenzweig (1995). Learning by doing and learning from others: Hu-
man capital and technical change in agriculture. The Journal of Political Economy 103 (6),
1176–1209.
Fowlie, M. (2010). Emissions trading, electricity restructing, and investment in pollution
abatement. The American Economic Review , 837–869.
Fowlie, M., C. Knittel, and C. Wolfram (2012). Sacred cars? Cost-eﬀective regulation of
stationary and nonstationary pollution sources. American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy 4 (1), 98–126.
Fowlie, M. L. (2009). Incomplete environmental regulation, imperfect competition, and
emissions leakage. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy , 72–112.
Galiani, S., P. Gertler, and E. Schargrodsky (2005). Water for life: The impact of the
privatization of water services on child mortality. Journal of Political Economy 113 (1).
40
Gallego, F., J.-P. Montero, and C. Salas (2012). The eﬀect of transport policies on car use:
Theory and evidence from Latin American cities. Working Paper .
Gertler, P., O. Shelef, C. Wolfram, and A. Fuchs (2011). Poverty, growth, and the demand
for energy. Working Paper .
Graﬀ Zivin, J., S. Hsiang, and M. Neidell (2013). Climate, human capital and adaptation.
Working Paper .
Graﬀ-Zivin, J. and M. Neidell (2012). Temperature and the allocation of time: Implications
for climate change. Journal of Labor Economics Forthcoming.
Greenstone, M. and R. Hanna (2013). Environmental regulations, air and water pollution,
and infant mortality in India. Working Paper .
Greenstone, M. and A. Looney (2012). Paying too much for energy? The true costs of our
energy choices. Daedalus 141 (2), 10–30.
Grossman, G. M. and A. B. Krueger (1995). Economic growth and the environment. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (2), 353–377.
Hall, R. E. and C. I. Jones (2007). The value of life and the rise in health spending. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, 39–72.
Hanna, R. and P. Oliva (2011). The eﬀect of pollution on labor supply: Evidence from a
natural experiment in Mexico City. Working Paper .
Harbaugh, W. T., A. Levinson, and D. M. Wilson (2002). Reexamining the empirical ev-
idence for an environmental Kuznets curve. Review of Economics and Statistics 84 (3),
541–551.
Hassan, R., R. Scholes, and N. Ash (2005). Ecosystems and human well-being: current state
and trends. Island Press: Washington 1.
Hassler, J. and P. Krusell (2012). Economics and climate change: Integrated assessment in
a multi-region world. Journal of the European Economic Association 10 (5), 974–1000.
Hemous, D. (2012). Environmental policy and directed technical change in a global economy:
The dynamic impact of unilateral environmental policies.
41
Henderson, V., A. Storeygard, and D. Weil (2011). A bright idea for measuring economic
growth. The American Economic Review 101 (3), 194–199.
Heutel, G. and C. Fischer (2013). Environmental macroeconomics: Environmental policy,
business cycles, and directed technical change. Technical report, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Hsiang, S. and D. Narita (2012). Adaptation to cyclone risk: Evidence from the global
cross-section. Climate Change Economics 3.
Hsieh, C.-T. and P. Klenow (2009). Misallocation and manufacturing TFP in China and
India. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, 1403–1448.
IPCC (2001). Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to
the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Jack, B. K. (2013). Private information and the allocation of land use subsidies in Malawi.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5, 113.
Jalan, J. and E. Somanathan (2008). The importance of being informed: Experimental
evidence on demand for environmental quality. Journal of Development Economics 87 (1),
14–28.
Jayachandran, S. (2009). Air quality and early-life mortality: Evidence from Indonesia’s
wildfires. Journal of Human Resources 44 (4).
Kelly, D. L. and C. D. Kolstad (1999). Integrated assessment models for climate change
control. International yearbook of environmental and resource economics 1999/2000: A
survey of current issues, 171–197.
Kremer, M. (1993). The O-ring theory of economic development. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 108 (3), 551–575.
Kremer, M., J. Leino, E. Miguel, and A. P. Zwane (2011). Spring cleaning: Rural wa-
ter impacts, valuation, and property rights institutions. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 126, 145–205.
Lemos, M. C. and A. Agrawal (2006). Environmental governance. Annual Review of Envi-
ronment and Resources 31, 297–325.
42
Le’on, G. and E. Miguel (2012). Transportation choices, fatalism and the value of life in
Africa. Working Paper .
Lin, C., W. Zhang, and V. Umanskaya (2011). On the design of driving restrictions: Theory
and empirical evidence. Working Paper .
Lipscomb, M. (2008). The eﬀect of environmental enforcement on product choice and com-
petition: Theory and evidence from India.
Lipscomb, M. and A. M. Mobarak (2011). Decentralization and the political economy of
water pollution: Evidence from the re-drawing of county borders in Brazil. Working
Paper .
Lipscomb, M., M. A. Mobarak, and T. Barham (2013). Development eﬀects of electrifica-
tion: Evidence from the topographic placement of hydropower plants in Brazil. American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5 (2), 200–231.
Lofgren, A., P. Martinsson, M. Hennlock, and T. Sterner (2011). Are experienced people
aﬀected by a pre-set default option? Results from a field experiment. Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management 63, 66–72.
Madajewicz, M., A. Pfaﬀ, A. Van Geen, J. Graziano, I. Hussein, H. Momotaj, R. Sylvi,
and H. Ahsan (2007). Can information alone change behavior? Response to arsenic
contamination of groundwater in Bangladesh. Journal of Development Economics 84 (2),
731–754.
McRae, S. (2009). Infrastructure quality and the subsidy trap. Stanford Institute for Eco-
nomic Policy Research, Discussion Paper , 09–017.
Miller, G. and A. M. Mobarak (2011). Intra-household externalities and low demand for a
new technology: Experimental evidence on improved cookstoves. Working Paper .
Mullainathan, S. (2006). Understanding Poverty, Chapter Better Choices to Reduce Poverty,
pp. 379–389. Oxford University Press.
Nordhaus, W. (2011). Integrated economic and climate modeling. Working Paper .
Oliva, P. (2010). Environmental regulations and corruption: Automobile emissions in Mexico
City. Working Paper .
43
Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 14, 137–158.
Pattanayak, S. K., S. Wunder, and P. J. Ferraro (2010). Show me the money: Do pay-
ments supply environmental services in developing countries? Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy 4 (2), 254–274.
PBL (2012). Trends in global CO2 emissions 2012. Technical report, Netherlands Environ-
mental Assessment Agency.
Peltzman, S. (1975). The eﬀects of automobile safety regulation. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 83, 667–725.
Pfaﬀ, A., J. Robalino, and G. A. Sanchez-Azofeifa (2008). Payments for environmental
services: Empirical analysis for Costa Rica. Working Paper .
Pitt, M., M. Rosenzweig, and N. Hassan (2012). Identifying the hidden costs of a public
health success: Arsenic well water contamination and productivity in Bangladesh. Working
Paper .
Pitt, M., M. Rosenzweig, and R. Hussam (2010). Short- and long-term health eﬀects of
burning biomass in the home in low-income countries. Working Paper .
Ryan, N. (2012a). The competitive eﬀects of transmission infrastructure in the Indian day-
ahead electricity market. Working Paper .
Ryan, S. P. (2012b). The costs of environmental regulation in a concentrated industry.
Econometrica 80 (3), 1019–1061.
Schlenker, W. and D. B. Lobell (2010). Robust negative impacts of climate change on African
agriculture. Environmental Research Letters 5, 014010.
Sekhri, S. (2011). Public provision and protection of natural resources: Groundwater irriga-
tion in rural India. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3, 29–55.
Shapiro, J. (2012). Trade, CO2, and the environment. Technical report, Working Paper.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (2002). The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their
Cures. Harvard University Press.
44
Shogren, J. and L. Taylor (2008). On behavioral-environmental economics. Review of Envi-
ronmental Economics and Policy 2 (1), 26–44.
Sims, K. R. (2010). Conservation and development: Evidence from Thai protected areas.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 60, 94–114.
Smith, V. K. (2012). ReflectionsÑin search of crosswalks between macroeconomics and
environmental economics. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 6 (2), 298–317.
Somanathan, E. (2010). Eﬀects of information on environmental quality in developing coun-
tries. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 4 (2), 275–292.
Stern, D. I. (2004). The rise and fall of the environmental Kuznets curve. World Develop-
ment 32 (8), 1419–1439.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1989). Markets, market failures, and development. The American Economic
Review 79 (2), 197–203.
Taraz, V. (2012). Adaptation to climate change: Historical evidence from the Indian mon-
soon. Working Paper .
United Nations (2009). State of the world’s indigeous people. Technical report, UN Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Aﬀairs.
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) (2001). The well-being of nations. Technical
report, Global Environmental Monitoring System/Water Quality Monitoring System.
Vennemo, H., K. Aunan, H. Lindhjem, and H. M. Seip (2009). Environmental pollution in
China: Status and trends. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 3 (2), 209–230.
Viard, B. and S. Fu (2011). The eﬀect of Beijing’s driving restrictions on pollution and
economic activity. Working Paper .
Vincent, J. R. (2010). Microeconomic analysis of innovative environmental programs in
developing countries. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 4 (2), 221–233.
Viscusi, K. and J. Aldy (2003). The value of a statistical life: A critical review of market
estimates throughout the world. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27 (1), 5–76.
45
Vohs, K., R. Baumeister, B. Schmeichel, J. Twenge, N. Nelson, and D. Tice (2008). Making
choices impairs subsequent self-control: A limited resource account of decision making,
self-regulation, and active initiative. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 94,
883–898.
Wolfram, C., O. Shelef, and P. Gertler (2012). How will energy demand develop in the
developing world? Journal of Economic Perspectives 26, 119–138.
World Health Organization (2004). Global health observatory data repository. Technical
report.
World Health Organization (2011). Database: outdoor air pollution in cities. Technical
report, Public Health and Environment.
46
Figure 1: Environmental quality in developed and developing countries
(a) Air pollution
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(b) Water pollution
Notes: Panel A shows average particular matter from urban centers, in µg/m3, using data from
the World Health Organization (2011). Panel B shows dissolved oxygen, in mls/litre, using data
from the United Nations Environment Program (2001). The four most populous developed and
developing countries are shown, ranked according to the pollution measure.
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Figure 2: Burden of diseases in developed and developing countries
(a) Disease burden from air pollution
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100,000 from water, sanitation and hygiene. Data are from the World Health Organization (2004)
for the 4 most populous developed and developing countries.
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